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Abstract: 
Committees on a board of directors are now subject to recommendations by regulations in 
practically all jurisdictions. At the same time, scholarly work on the topic has escalated since the 
mid-1990s. In this review article, we examine relevant literature on board committees of audit, 
compensation and nomination, as part of corporate governance research in general, over the period 
of 1988 to 2011. We observed an exponential growth in contributions over time, the majority of 
which can be attributed to management and accounting scholars. The audit committee is the most 
researched of all three committees, with the nomination committee being the least researched. An 
analysis of the literature generated a picture that included the following features: 1) the dominance 
of the agency theory; 2) a lack of other unifying theoretical frameworks; 3) a strong US-centrism; 4) 
the prevalence of quantitative research methods. 
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1 Introduction 
 
It has been more than 20 years since the publication of the Cadbury Report (1992). Since then, we 
have observed a notable increase in contributions to corporate governance literature (Durisin and 
Puzone, 2009; Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009; cf., Hamidi and Gabrielsson, 2014; Steger, 2014). At the 
same time, the regulators have increasingly recommended the establishment of three board 
committees; namely audit, compensation and remuneration (e.g., UK Corporate Governance Code, 
2014). This was accompanied by the commencement of academic work devoted to examining the 
functioning of these committees (e.g., Bilimoria and Piderit, 1994; Daily et al., 1998; Kesner, 1988). 
The idea behind the establishment of these board committees is additional delegation, and the 
strengthening and specialisation of processes that the board of directors perform. In a nutshell, 
audit committees are entrusted with the task of providing accurate and high quality financial 
information. Compensation committees are responsible for devising well-constructed incentive 
plans for managers. Finally, nomination committees optimise the director nomination and selection 
process. All committees constitute sub-sets of directors of the composition of the entire corporate 
board. Their remit is codified in the regulatory documents, such as the UK Corporate Governance 
Code (2014). 
In this work, we undertook the task of reviewing the extant sub-strand of corporate governance 
literature on  board  committees  over  the  period  of 1988  to  2011.  Based on Durisin and Puzone 
(2009), we selected 17 management, accounting and finance/economics journals, and performed a 
search for contributions on board committees. Our search procedure resulted in 90 relevant 
academic articles from 12 journals, which we then analysed and coded. The main coding themes 
were ‘theory’ and ‘methodology’. 
The research findings indicated an exponential growth of contributions over time. Until the mid-
1990s, contributions had been extremely rare, whereas in the last sub-period of 2004 to 2011, two-
thirds of the reviewed articles were published. The audit committee, as the most mature 
institutional arrangement, proved the most popular of all three committees in terms of research 
carried out, whilst on the other hand, there was a scarcity of scholarly work on the nomination 
committee (cf., Carson, 2002). The number of contributions on the compensation committee is 
placed in-between. The majority of the reviewed articles came from the management and 
accounting disciplines, and the finance/economics field of study was least represented. 
Analysis of the reviewed articles yielded a pattern of results which resembled those in the corporate 
governance literature, in general. There was a prevalence of contributions based on the agency 
theory or such pieces of work which are de facto ‘atheoretical’. We detected a strong US-centrism in 
board committee research, and in broader terms, a concentration of articles on the Anglo-Saxon 
capitalist countries. There was a paucity of research on countries outside of North America and 
Europe. Finally, the majority of contributions adopted quantitative research methods and regression 
analysis. Only around 20% embraced the qualitative approach in their methodologies. Amongst 
studies based on the quantitative research methods, a substantial share of them scrutinised the 
longitudinal dimension of their dataset and undertook panel data analysis, which demonstrates a 
reasonable advancement in the adopted methodologies. 
As can be inferred from the academic literature and the regulatory documents, board committees 
play an increasing role in the corporate governance architecture. More and more tasks are 
streamlined through the committee work as opposed to the general board proceedings. Hence, it is 
critically important for corporate governance scholars to stay abreast of the developments in this 
sub-field of the corporate governance research stream. Therefore, the review undertaken in this 
work was conceived as a contribution to help scholars better follow the developments in the 
academic work on board committees. It is also meant to aid with the consolidation, regrouping and 
setting the research agenda for the future with regards to board committee work. For example, 
upcoming issues, such as the agency theory domination or the scarcity of contributions from the 
finance/economics field, indicate that there is ample room for instilling insights to board committee 
research informed by other theories and being looked at from a rigorous financial/economic 
perspective. Agency theory domination reduces the focus to economic incentives and means of 
control of the agent directors, whereas the entire human and behavioural side of governance is left 
out (Daily et al., 2003; Huse, 2005; Huse et al., 2011; Pettigrew, 1992; Viganò et al., 2011). A 
financial/economic perspective, in turn, if adopted, could be a source of rigorous modelling and 
predictions that would enrich those present in the management and accounting literature on board 
committees. 
The review article is structured as follows. First, the theoretical backdrop is outlined in terms of the 
literature on corporate governance in general, board of directors, and board committees. Next, the 
methodology is explained and the research findings presented. The discussion section, together with 
limitations and ideas for future research, concludes the paper. 
 
2 Corporate governance literature: board committees 
 
Corporate governance literature dates back to the dialogue between Berle and Means (1932). 
However, the event that gave it strong impetus was the Cadbury Committee (1992) in the UK, from 
which time we observed an actual lift-off of academic contributions to that stream of research. In 
1993 Corporate Governance: An International Review, a specialty journal, was established. In 1998, 
the first UK corporate governance code was released (Combined Code, 1998). These dynamic 
developments, since the early 1990s,  are  reflected  in  the  fact  that  some  scholars  recognise  
corporate  governance research as an autonomous field of study now, which reveals features of a 
separate discipline (Durisin and Puzone, 2009; Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009). 
Daily et al. (2003, p.371) define governance as “the determination of the broad uses to which 
organizational resources will be deployed and the resolution of conflicts among the myriad 
participants in organizations”. In a similar vein, following Aoki (2001), Filatotchev and Boyd (2009) 
view corporate governance as “a structure of rights and responsibilities among the parties with a 
stake in the firm”. Contrary to Shleifer and Vishny’s (1997) definition, both aforementioned 
definitions reach out beyond the shareholder-manager dyad and encompass other stakeholders. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) point out that corporate governance is about how shareholders get a 
return on their investment. 
The board of directors is a central corporate governance mechanism. It represents an internal 
institutional solution which is meant to bridge the relationship between shareholders and executive 
managers. Boards encompass the committees within their structure, so the analysis of committees’ 
structure, remit and functions is inextricably linked to the board of directors in general. So, in what 
follows we first depict the board types, roles and structures and against this backdrop, we consider 
the presence of the three main board committees in corporate governance literature: audit, 
compensation and nomination. This sub-strand of corporate governance literature can be traced 
back to the seminal contribution by Kesner (1988). However, similar to the entire field of study, it 
experienced intensification of efforts in the aftermath of the Cadbury Report (1992), as evidenced 
later in our literature review. 
 
A board of directors 
Corporate boards represent a somewhat central internal mechanism of corporate governance, 
because they are located within an organisational structure of a corporation and incorporate an 
interface between managers and non-executive directors. The latter protect shareholders’ interests. 
Other institutions of governance encompass regulatory framework, ownership structure, 
incentivisation of managers, managerial labour market, takeover activity, and product market 
competition (Daily et al., 2003; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Ricketts, 2002). This heightened 
research interest in boards of directors is well reflected in Durisin and Puzone’s (2009) bibliometric 
analysis of corporate governance literature. They identified strands of work on board structure  and 
composition, as well as board members’ characteristics, as one of the dominant streams of research 
in this literature with a substantial number of contributions. 
There are two main types of boards. In Anglo-Saxon capitalism there is a unitary/monistic board 
structure, where both the executive and non-executive segments are combined. In Rhine capitalism, 
there is typically a two-tier board structure installed, with a separate management/executive board 
and a supervisory/non-executive board. The Anglo-Saxon model is based on the common law system 
in which a controlling shareholder appoints both executive and non-executive directors. The investor 
protection is comparably strong through the majoritarian electoral mechanism. The fluid capital 
investment system focuses on shareholder value, and hence this model is referred to as market-
oriented. The Rhine model of corporate governance, in turn, is network-oriented and based on the 
civil law system. The proportional electoral mechanism tends to lend support to employment as 
opposed to shareholder protection. The dedicated capital investment  system,  with  a  particular  
role  for  banks  and  other  financial  institutions, focuses on stakeholder rather than shareholder 
value. Whereas in the Anglo-Saxon model with one-tier boards committees are clearly structurally 
subjected to them, in the Rhine model they are tied to the supervisory/non-executive segment only 
(Albert, 1993; Collier and Zaman, 2005; Demb and Neubauer, 1992; Kwee et al., 2011; La Porta et al., 
1998). 
Integrating the agency and resource-dependence theories, Hillman and Dalziel (2003) distinguish 
between the monitoring and resource-provision functions of the board of directors. The former 
consists in controlling and the provision of checks and balances to the management by non-
executive directors. The latter signifies the mechanism of provision of resources to the focal 
company through external professional networks of board members. The alternative taxonomies of 
board functions indicate, additionally, the service and strategy-consulting/making roles (cf., Johnson 
et al., 1996; Minichilli et al., 2009; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). 
 
The three main board committees 
In line with the provisions of corporate governance codes, boards of directors increasingly delegate 
duties to the sub-sets of their members, called board committees. There are typically three main 
board committees distinguished: audit, compensation and nomination. However, at times, 
companies install modified and/or different/additional committees, such as corporate governance, 
corporate social responsibility or technology committees (this list is by no means exhaustive). The 
idea behind this  institutional solution is further delegation and specialisation of processes for which 
the board is responsible. The audit committee provides accurate and high quality financial 
information, the compensation committee generates well-designed incentive plans for managers 
and the nomination committee is responsible for the optimisation of the director nomination and 
selection process. The regulator recommends that, as a rule, all three committees are composed of 
independent, non-executive directors (e.g., Conyon and Mallin, 1997; Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), 
2002; UK Corporate  Governance Code, 2014). 
Initially, the board committees rarely featured in scholarly work. Until the mid-1990s, there were 
only a handful of contributions, which mainly examined the composition aspects of the board 
committee structure, e.g., the presence and the role of women on board committees (e.g., Bilimoria 
and Piderit, 1994; Kesner, 1988). Since the mid-1990s, we have observed a proper lift-off of 
contributions on board committees in the corporate governance literature, which in large part 
scrutinised the different aspects of the newly enacted regulations, such as the Cadbury Report 
(1992) or the Combined Code (1998) in the UK and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) in the US. This was 
frequently combined with the analysis of corporate governance problems that were highlighted by 
the prominent scandals at the turn of the century, such as Enron, Tyco, or Parmalat. Such an 
approach is particularly visible in the accounting literature with regard to the audit committees. In 
the end, in the final period of the time frame of our study, i.e., in the years 2004–2011, there are the 
echoes of the financial crisis of 2007–2008 present in the literature and the related analysis of the 
role that the board committees should play in the corporate governance architecture. There was a 
generally high level of consensus in the sample of the reviewed articles with regard to the remit and 
functions of particular committees. In addition, some contributions looked at the origins, evolution 
and current customary practices of the board committees (e.g., Adut et al., 2003; Bebchuk et al., 
2010; Carcello and Neal, 2000, 2003; Conyon and Peck, 1998; Daily et al., 1998; Eminet 
and Guedri, 2010; Ruigrok et al., 2006; Spira, 1998, 2003; Turley and Zaman, 2004). 
Since the UK regulatory framework in the area of corporate governance traditionally serves as a 
landmark for other jurisdictions, in what follows we provide an in-depth description of the structure, 
remit and functions of board committees based on the UK regulatory context. 
 
Audit committee 
The origins of audit committees can be traced back to the 1940s in the US and early 1990s in Europe. 
They had been extremely rare before the early 1990s in continental Europe, as they are primarily an 
institution of Anglo-Saxon capitalism. Audit committees are nevertheless, comparably, the most 
established and mature out of all board committees. They are entrusted with the task of ensuring 
high standards in financial reporting that underpin confidence in financial markets (Carson, 2002; 
Collier and Zaman, 2005; European Commission, 2003; Habbash, 2013). 
More specifically, in the UK, it is recommended that the audit committee should comprise of at least 
three members, and in the case of small companies (not in the FTSE 350 index), two members. At 
least one member should possess recent and relevant financial experience (cf., SOX,  2002;  Security  
Exchange  Commission  (SEC),  1999; cf., McDaniel et al., 2002). Audit committees should monitor 
the integrity of financial statements and any formal announcements pertaining to the focal 
company’s financial performance. Moreover, they are meant to review the company’s internal 
financial controls, as well as risk management systems, unless the latter is addressed explicitly by a 
separate risk committee or by the board itself. Finally, their duties also encompass monitoring and 
review of the company’s internal audit function, recommendations to shareholders regarding the 
external auditor (appointment and remuneration), review and monitoring of the external auditor’s 
independence and objectivity, and the development and implementation of the policy on the 
engagement of the external auditor to supply non-audit services (UK Corporate Governance Code, 
2014). 
The role of the audit committees in discharging their responsibilities should be described in a 
separate section of the company’s annual report. Such an account of the audit committee work 
should outline any significant issues that arise in committee consideration with regard to financial 
statements, information on the external audit process (appointment, tenure), and an explanation of 
how auditor objectivity and independence are safeguarded, if the external auditor provides non-
audit services (Collier and Zaman, 2005; Habbash, 2013; UK Corporate Governance Code, 2014; cf., 
Bart, 2010). 
 
Compensation committee 
Similarly to the audit committees, compensation committees had been known in the US long before 
the European countries. They are described as a developing and maturing structure, contrary to 
audit committees, which are a well-established institution. The remit of compensation committees is 
to manage corporate executive annual incentive compensation plans. In broader terms, they are 
designed to review the terms and conditions of employment of senior management (Adut et al., 
2003; Carson, 2002; Conyon and Peck, 1998; cf., Conyon and Mallin, 1997). 
Following the UK corporate governance code, the board should call into existence a compensation 
committee of at least three, and in case of non-FTSE 350 companies, two independent non-
executive directors. The committee has a responsibility for setting remuneration of the chairman 
and all executive directors, inclusive of pension rights and any potential compensation payments. 
The level and structure of remuneration for senior management, which is typically the first layer of 
management below the board level, should be also recommended and monitored by the committee. 
The compensation committee should be responsible for managing any potential conflicts of interest 
when receiving views from executive directors or senior management. Finally, it is also responsible 
for appointing any remuneration consultants with regards to the executive director remuneration, 
and should make sure that the committee chairman maintains contact with its principal 
shareholders about remuneration as required (UK Corporate Governance Code, 2014). 
The compensation committee should exercise judgment regarding the positioning of their company, 
relative to other firms. This should be done with caution, however, in order to avoid the risk of an 
upward movement in remuneration levels with no corresponding improvement in corporate and 
individual performance. The compensation committee should make available its terms of reference, 
explaining its role and the authority assigned to it by the board. If remuneration consultants are 
appointed, it should provide a separate statement in the annual report to identify them and to 
indicate whether they have any material connection with the focal company (UK Corporate 
Governance Code, 2014; cf., Conyon and Peck, 1998; Ezzamel and Watson, 1998). 
 
Nomination committee 
Nomination committees are comparably the youngest board institution, and hence are described as 
relatively immature. Their remit is two-fold, namely the professionalisation of the director selection 
process and optimisation of director selection decisions, and secondly, regular review of board 
performance. Ultimately, they should aim to improve board effectiveness by managing its 
composition, i.e., selecting directors with required qualification profiles and raising board 
independence (Carson, 2002; Eminet and Guedri, 2010; Ruigrok et al., 2006; Walther and Morner, 
2014). 
The UK corporate governance code stipulates that a majority of the nomination committee 
members should be independent non-executive directors. The board chairman or an independent 
non-executive director should be leading the committee, with the exception of instances where it is 
dealing with the succession in board chairmanship. The procedure for appointment of new directors 
to the board should be formal, rigorous and transparent. There should be a search for board 
candidates, with appointments made on merit and against objective criteria, with appropriate 
regard for the benefits of (gender) diversity on the board. The entire process should ideally result in 
the maintenance of an appropriate balance of skills and experience within the company and on the 
board, and ensuring progressive refreshment of board composition. Nomination committees are 
responsible for leading that process and making recommendations to the board. Finally, they are 
also responsible for the evaluation of the balance of skills, experience, independence and knowledge 
on the board (UK Corporate Governance Code, 2014). 
The nomination committee should make available its terms of reference, that is to explain its role 
and the authority assigned to it by the board. The work of the nomination committee, including the 
process it has launched for board appointments, should be described in a separate section of the 
annual report. This should also incorporate the board’s policy on (gender) diversity, inclusive of any 
quantifiable objectives that were set for that policy implementation, as well as any progress made 
towards achieving those objectives. If neither an external search consultancy, nor open advertising 
has been used for the appointment of a chairman or a non-executive director, an explanation should 
be provided. Finally, in a similar vein, if an external search consultancy has been used, it has to be 
identified in the annual report and a statement provided as to whether this consultancy has any 
material connection with the focal company (UK Corporate Governance Code, 2014; cf., Eminet and 
Guedri, 2010; Ruigrok et al., 2006; Walther and Morner, 2014). 
 
 
3 Methodology 
 
For the purpose of this literature review, 17 journals have been identified. They encompass 
management, finance/economics, and accounting journals. The journal selection is based on Durisin 
and Puzone’s (2009) study, which has provided one of the most comprehensive bibliometric 
analyses of the corporate governance field to date. The chosen journals have been identified as 
leading and influential outlets in the respective fields of management, finance/economics, and 
accounting (e.g., Alexander and Mabry, 1994; Borokhovich et al., 2000; Podsakoff et al., 2005; 
Reinstein and Calderon, 2006; Schwartz et al., 2005; Tahai and Meyer, 1999). Accordingly, the 
journals studied were Academy of Management Review (AMR), Academy of Management Journal 
(AMJ), Accounting Review (AR), Administrative Science Quarterly (ASQ), Corporate Governance: An 
International Review (CGIR), International Journal of Accounting (IJA), Journal of Accounting and 
Economics (JAE), Journal of Accounting Research (JAR), Journal of Business (JB), Journal of Finance 
(JF), Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Journal of Management and Governance (JMG), 
Management Science (MS), Organization Science (OS), Review of Economic Studies (RES), Review of 
Financial Studies (RFS), Strategic Management Journal (SMJ). 
These journals were searched for the period of 1988 to 2011. The starting date of 1988 was selected 
based upon the fact that it is the year of publication of the paper by Kesner (1988). This is the 
seminal contribution on board committees to which the following articles refer (e.g., Bilimoria and 
Piderit, 1994). The year 2011 was selected as the end date because that is when this research 
started. So, altogether, there are 24 years of issues of the identified 17 journals, and these were 
searched for the occurrence of articles on the three types of board committees; audit, 
compensation, and nomination. The search phrase used was the word ‘committee’, which was 
looked for in either the title or the abstract of the papers. This procedure resulted in 95 articles 
which fulfilled the search criterion. Then, the generated articles were scrutinised from the point of 
view of their usability in this research. Contributions on committees from not-for-profit companies 
were excluded, and so were shorter article review papers that did not constitute fully-fledged 
academic articles. This elimination procedure produced the final sample of 90 academic papers from 
12 journals. For five journals, the number of articles returned was zero, and therefore they did not 
enter the data analysis: AMR, JB, MS, OS, and RES. The breakdown of the number of contributions 
for each of the remaining 12 journals is presented in Table 1. 
  
Table 1 - A number of contributions on board committees per journal 
No. Academic Journal Number of contributions in the period 
1988-2011 
1 Academy of Management Journal (AMJ) 9 
2 Accounting Review (AR) 20 
3 Administrative Science Quarterly (ASQ) 1 
4 Corporate Governance: An International Review 
(CGIR) 
28 
5 International Journal of Accounting (IJA) 3 
6 Journal of Accounting and Economics (JAE) 5 
7 Journal of Accounting Research (JAR) 6 
8 Journal of Finance (JF) 3 
9 Journal of Financial Economics (JFE) 2 
10 Journal of Management and Governance (JMG) 7 
11 Review of Financial Studies (RFS) 2 
12 Strategic Management Journal (SMJ) 4 
 TOTAL 90 
 
The identified articles were read, summarised and coded with regard to the following review 
themes: ‘theoretical background’, ‘methodology’, ‘sample’ (country; longitudinal versus cross-
sectional), ‘board committee covered’, ‘main findings’, and ‘managerial implications’. The coding 
categories were not prepared in advance and they were applied on an ad-hoc basis, given the variety 
and multi-disciplinarity of the analysed contributions. Two researchers read the papers and did the 
coding. There was a very high inter-rater agreement (about 90%) on assigning the reviewed papers 
to the particular coding categories within the identified review themes. 
 
Table 2 - A number of contributions on board committees per discipline 
 Discipline in management and economics science 
Management Finance and 
economics 
Accounting 
AMJ, ASQ, CGIR, JMG, SMJ JF, JFE, RFS AR, IJA, JAE, JAR 
Number of contributions (1988-
2011) 
49 7 34 
 
  
4 Research findings 
 
Distribution of contributions 
As can be identified from Table 1, the greatest number of contributions comes from CGIR (28), since 
this journal is specifically devoted to matters of corporate governance. The next journal that is most 
abundant with papers on board committees is AR (20). The number of contributions in each of the 
remaining journals does not exceed ten, whereby AMJ with nine and JMG with seven occupy the 
following places in terms of the number of identified studies. The distribution of the sample articles 
by journal also reflects the breakdown of articles by discipline of study, i.e., management, 
finance/economics, and accounting, which is illustrated in Table 2. 
The greatest number of contributions (49) is published in the management journals (AMJ, ASQ, CGIR, 
JMG, and SMJ), which is then followed by accounting contributions 
(34) in the respective journals (AR, IJA, JAE and JAR). By far, the lowest number of articles (7) on 
board committees comes from the finance/economics discipline (JF, JFE and RFS). Therefore, the 
management and accounting discipline combined, account for over 90% of all sample articles. 
Accordingly, there appears ample room for a higher number of contributions from the 
finance/economics perspective to board committee research. The financial/economics perspective 
could be a source of rigorous modelling and insights that would enrich and counter-balance those 
present in the management and accounting literature on board committees. 
An interesting insight arises when the breakdown of contributions is analysed by a sub-period of 
study. We divided the period of study into three equal sub-periods of eight years (Table 3). The first 
sub-period pre-dates publication of the UK Cadbury Report (1992) and encompasses a few years 
following this landmark event in the corporate governance field. The middle sub-period is set prior 
to the enactment of the US SOX Act (2002) and also incorporates one year thereafter. The end of 
this sub-period is also known for the emergence of significant corporate governance scandals, such 
as Enron, Tyco, Worldcom or Parmalat, as well as the dot.com bubble. Finally, the most recent sub-
period comprises the financial crisis of 2007–2008 as a mid-point. 
 
Table 3 - A number of contributions on board committees per study period 
 A study period broken up in three 
1988-1995: ‘Cadbury 
Time’ 
1996-2003: ‘SOX 
time’ 
2004-2011: ‘Most 
recent’ 
Number of 
contributions 
4 26 60 
 
This analysis demonstrates a clear increase in the number of contributions by a factor of six between 
the first and second sub-period, which represents exponential growth. The increase between sub-
period two and three is by a factor of two. Accordingly, we observed that contributions on board 
committees had been extremely rare before the mid-1990s (cf., Daily et al., 1998). In the aftermath 
of the Cadbury Report (1992), and the immediate years following, we can see a proper lift-off of this 
literature. This signals an increasing awareness of its importance in the corporate governance 
community of scholars. Finally, in the most recent sub-period, the number of contributions is 
doubled compared to the preceding sub-period, and this demonstrates that the ample scope for 
contributions to the stream of board committee research has started to be embraced in academic 
literature. Sixty journal articles spanning a period of eight years, in 12 journals, may well indicate 
that this stream of literature has begun to mature and saturate. 
However, on the other hand, this exponential growth in terms of contributions on board committees 
may be partly attributed to the fact that new journals were established in the analysed period, such 
as CGIR in 1993, and that journals were publishing more articles over the years. We therefore 
checked CGIR as a specialty corporate governance journal for the distribution of articles on board 
committees between the three distinguished sub-periods and for the number of articles published at 
the beginning of each sub-period. We found that that there were no articles on board committees 
published in the first sub-period (1988–1995), six appeared in the second sub-period (1996–2003), 
and 22 were issued in the third sub-period (2004–2011). At the same time, the table of contents 
indicated the presence of 11 items in 1993, nine items in 1996 and 15 items in 2004. So, we can 
conclude that the introduction of the specialty corporate governance journal certainly had a 
profound effect on our results. The number of articles in the table of contents displays a changeable 
pattern, so it is difficult to conclude that our findings are affected by the increases in the number of 
published articles per volume by journals. So, overall, we are entitled to state that the identified 
exponential growth in terms of the number of articles on board committees published in the three 
identified sub-periods is still largely explained by the increasing relative attention of scholars to this 
topical area. 
Finally, the analysis of contributions by a particular board committee demonstrates that the remarks 
by Carson (2002), on the maturity of the respective committee, are well reflected in the board 
committee research (Table 4). By far, the greatest number of contributions is on the audit 
committees, which is the oldest and most established out of all committees. Additionally, since the 
accounting discipline is the second biggest contributor to board committee research, it would 
naturally follow that a significant number of accounting papers would focus on audit committees, 
which touches upon the nature of this profession. Only half of the number of reviewed articles on 
audit committees covers compensation committees, which is described by Carson (2002) as a 
maturing board institution. At the other end of the spectrum, we have nomination committees with 
the most modest number of contributions, which constitutes slightly more than half of the 
contributions on compensation committees. Again, nomination committees are referred to as 
relatively immature by Carson (2002). Finally, it is worth noting that committees other than the main 
three committees analysed in this paper, such as governance, public affairs, or risk management 
committee, featured 19 times in the sample of reviewed articles. They constitute important parts of 
the corporate architecture, however they are not encountered as frequently as the three main 
committees that are an object of focus in this paper. This analysis demonstrates that the greatest 
room for contributions is in the area of nomination committees, which are by far the least 
researched out of all three committees. 
Audit committees are considered in conjunction with the quality of financial reporting, internal 
control function, or the provision of audit and non-audit consulting services, among others. There 
are also contributions on the development of this corporate governance institution over the years 
and certain ‘ritual’ practices that can be identified in its operations. As mentioned before, audit 
committees are especially popular in accounting literature, therefore in AR, IJA, JAE and JAR (e.g., 
Abbott et al., 2007; Agoglia et al., 2011; Arthaud-Day et al., 2006; Carcello and Neal, 2000, 2003; 
Spira, 1998, 2003; Turley and Zaman, 2004). 
Remuneration committees predominantly feature in research on the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO)/executive compensation and the related processes.  This  research considers, for example, 
board and/or compensation committee composition and its impact on the CEO/executive 
compensation, the role of the compensation committee in establishing it, or the bidding up/social 
comparison processes. Research on compensation committees is equally likely to appear in 
management, accounting and financial/economics journals (e.g., Adut et al., 2003; Bebchuk et al., 
2010; Belliveau et al., 1996; Cheng, 2004; Conyon and Peck, 1998; Daily et al., 1998; Ezzamel and 
Watson, 1998; O’Reilly et al., 1988). 
Finally, the least represented nomination committees are typically scrutinised with regard  to  the  
director  nomination  and  selection  process.  Specifically,  this  research touches upon the influence 
of the nomination committee composition in terms of the independent directors and/or CEOs on the 
board member selection decisions, as well as the nomination committee’s role in constructing a 
value-creating and well-composed board of directors. The research on board committees is well 
represented in the management and financial/economics journals,  but  less  so  in  the  accounting 
journals (Eminet and Guedri, 2010; Ruigrok et al., 2006; Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999; Zhang, 
2008). 
 
Table 4 - A number of contributions on particular board committees
1
 
 Board Committee
2
 
Audit Compensation Nomination 
Number of 
contributions 
66 33 19 
 
Notes: 
1 
Since there are studies covering more than one board committee, the number of contributions in total 
does not add up to the number of articles reviewed (90). 
2
 Other committees covered in the reviewed articles include: committee with a stakeholder orientation (e.g., 
public policy, social responsibility, contributions), corporate governance, environmental, executive, finance, 
governance, public affairs, risk, risk management, technology. Altogether ‘other’ committees featured 19 times 
in the reviewed articles. 
 
Theory 
No matter the extant criticism (Daily et al., 2003; Huse et al., 2011; Pettigrew, 1992; Viganò et al., 
2011), the agency theory remains the dominant theoretical lens in the corporate governance 
scholarship (Durisin and Puzone, 2009; Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009). The principal-agent problem, 
resulting from separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation, makes agents and 
principals inclined to invest in information systems and control mechanisms to alleviate the 
information asymmetry between the managers operating as agents and the shareholders as 
principals, respectively. Whereas decision management is delegated to the top management team, 
the decision control remains in the remit of the board of directors (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Tengamnuay and Stapleton, 2009). 
Equally, it is also the most utilised theory in board committee research. The underlying rationale is 
that board committees, as units specialising in matters of audit, compensation policy and director 
selection, can further reduce those information asymmetries between principals and agents. 
However, at the same time, on the cost side, an additional layer of agency relationship is created 
between the entire board and the respective committee. This is because a particular board 
committee is accountable to the entire board for its actions. To complicate matters further, one has 
to recognise that, in terms of their composition, board committees represent sub-sets of the whole 
board of directors, so particular directors feature on both sides of this relationship. This 
configurative property may lead to some additional complexities in the way particular board and 
board committee roles are executed. For example, a non-executive director as a member of any of 
the three committees is obliged to report, together with her/his board committee fellows, to the 
entire board, of which s/he is also a member. Such a situation is true for all the directors involved in 
the committee work on a given board. As a result, the lines of accountability among particular board 
members cross in a multiple way, creating a complex map of agency relationships. This engenders a 
situation in which directors on the board have multiple, potentially conflicting identities; acting at 
the same time as a member of the entire board and as a member of a particular committee. 
More than one-third of the reviewed articles (34) utilised the agency theory in its theoretical 
underpinnings. No other theory came close to that number. In some cases, the agency theory was 
part of the multi-theoretical approach in which it was used together with other theories. The multi-
theoretical approach was adopted in 11 papers. In addition to the agency theory, 13 theoretical 
perspectives were applied in the sampled articles: 
 
1. resource-dependence theory (Hillman et al., 2000; Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) 
2. legitimacy (Suchman, 1995) 
3. (neo-) institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 
1995) 
4. social psychology (human capital, social capital, social comparison, social influence, 
reciprocity) (Becker, 1964; Burt, 1992; Coleman, 1988; O’Reilly et al., 1988; Westphal and 
Milton, 2000) 
5. stewardship theory (Davis et al., 1997; Muth and Donaldson, 1998) 
6. labour market theory (Fama, 1980) 
7. cognitive dissonance theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) 
8. stakeholder theory (Freeman and Evan, 1990; Mitchell et al., 1997) 
9. judgment and decision-making (Anderson, 2000; Castellan, 1993; Yates, 1990) 
10. tournament theory (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Rosen, 1986) 
11. bargaining theory (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Ryan and Wiggins, 2004) 
12. group effectiveness/diversity literature (Milliken and Martins, 1996; Williams and O’Reilly, 
1998) 
13. actor-network theory (Callon, 1986; Law, 1992). 
Of these, none were featured more than four times and some of them were referred to on just one 
occasion. 
  
Table 5 - A number of contributions in the breakdown by theories used
1
 
 Theory 
Agency theory Multi-theoretical approach ‘Atheoretical’: no theoretical 
foundation used 
Number of 
contributions 
34 11 47 
 
Note: 
1
 Since there are studies covering more than one theory in the multi-theoretical category, the number of 
contributions in total does not add up to the number of articles reviewed (90). 
 
Although the rationale for the establishment of board committees is generally accepted as the 
delegation and specialisation of the respective processes for which the board is responsible, in terms 
of audit, corporate incentive plans and director nomination and selection, many of the analysed 
contributions are simply ‘atheoretical’. Almost half of the reviewed articles (47) did not adopt a 
single theoretical perspective for laying out its arguments. Sometimes, in the case of the review 
articles, this is understandable. However, generally speaking, this result is surprising. The breakdown 
of articles in terms of the theories used is presented in Table 5. 
It seems therefore, that with the exception of the agency theory, with which the existence and 
functioning of board committees can be broadly explained, there is no unifying theoretical 
framework that could be applied in the board committee research. This sub-field of corporate 
governance literature suffers from the lack of theory; the perspective that would explain why we 
have these three committees of audit, compensation, and nomination, and elucidate their 
composition, remit, and functions. What is even more intriguing is that although some of the 
reviewed papers attempt to provide such an explanation with the use of the agency theory, 
practically none of them identifies that problem. Only a handful of studies provided an original 
theoretical model explaining the mechanics of board committee work [e.g., Kornish and Levine 
(2004) for audit committees, or Laux and Laux (2009) for audit and compensation committees]. 
So, similarly to the entire field of corporate governance, board committee research should seek to 
break out beyond the confines of the principal-agent theorising with its rigid economic incentives 
and control mechanisms. There is ample scope for perspectives that would delve into the mechanics, 
composition and dynamics of work on board committees. In other words, there is a need to open 
the black box of board committee work (Daily et al., 2003; Huse et al., 2011; Pettigrew, 1992; Viganò 
et al., 2011). Critics may say that board committees meet only several times a year. Nevertheless, as 
the regulatory and academic work indicates, their role and importance is increasing (SOX, 2002; UK 
Corporate Governance Code, 2014). This is, therefore, probably the most significant deficiency of 
board committee literature, and in line with this, the most pressing need identified by this review 
paper, i.e., to start developing the theoretical foundation for board committee work. 
One exemplification of theory that could be conceivably applied to board committee research is the 
behavioural theory of corporate governance. This perspective builds on the meta-theoretical 
differences between the agency theory and the behavioural view of the firm and infuses the agency 
relationships with a social context. Accordingly, corporate board members are assumed not to act in 
the social vacuum and the analysis of their actions is enriched with the social fabric of norms, values 
and beliefs. Therefore, the socio-cognitive aspects in the individual’s decision-making are 
accentuated. This theory holds promise for scrutinising the behavioural or human side of corporate 
governance in relation to the board committee work (Huse, 2007; Westphal and Zajac, 2013). 
 
Etymology of data and method of analysis 
The analysis of the geographic scope of the sample articles indicated the dominance of the Anglo-
Saxon capitalist/common-law countries (La Porta et al., 1998). Among those contributions, we 
furthermore observed strong US-centrism in research, since over a half of  the  papers  reviewed  
(48)   draw   their   samples   from   the   population   of US  companies.  Together  with  studies  on  
UK   (8)   and   Australian   (4)   firms, they amount to 60 contributions. So, two-thirds of research 
papers are devoted to Anglo-Saxon/common-law countries. There are altogether 15 contributions 
based  on other country settings. However, only those on China and Spain reach beyond just one 
article, but at the same time, they do not exceed the number of four reviewed papers. The other 
countries with just one contribution include Canada, France, Italy, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, South 
Africa, Sweden, Switzerland and Thailand. There is, therefore, ample scope for research on civil-law 
countries, and within those, on countries belonging to the Germanic, Roman and Scandinavian legal 
families (La Porta et al., 1998), as well as for studies on countries from continents other than North 
America and Europe. Against this backdrop, four studies on China, Malaysia and Thailand, and one 
research paper on South Africa, represent modest, albeit important, seeds from which to develop 
and grow the number of contributions on Asian and African countries respectively. Finally, two 
studies adopted a multi-country setting; one encompassing G8 countries (Australia, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, UK and USA), and the other drawing a sample of companies from 37 countries 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange. An illustration of the distribution of the review articles by 
country is included in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 - A number of contributions in the breakdown by country
1
 
 Country
2
 
USA UK Other countries 
Number of contributions 48 8 19 
 
Notes: 
1
 Since some of the studies constitute entirely theoretical and/or review papers, the number of 
contributions in total does not add up to the number of articles reviewed (90). 
2
 Two studies adopted a multi-country setting; one comprising G8 countries (Australia, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, UK and USA), and the other drawing a sample of companies from 37 countries listed on 
the New York Stock Exchange. 
 
An investigation into the method of analysis indicated strong prevalence of quantitative research 
methods, with almost 80% of contributions (70). The remaining 20% were either based on 
qualitative research methods (11), or constituted articles with experimental evidence, theory-
building or literature review/research paper discussion (9). Eight studies reported explicit use of the 
survey/interview instrument. Accordingly, there is substantial scope for contributions based on 
qualitative evidence, which would delve into the details of composition and the dynamics of board 
committee work. An illustration of the breakdown of contributions by the type of the methodology 
used is presented in Table 7. 
  
Table 7 - A number of contributions in the breakdown by the type of methodology used 
 Methodology 
Quantitative Qualitative Other
1
 
Number of contributions 70 11 9 
 
Note: 
1
 The category ‘other’ comprises studies that are based on experimental evidence, contain theory-
building or literature reviews/research paper discussions. 
 
Amongst the articles based on the quantitative research methods, the use of regression analysis was 
the most dominant. The logistic/logit regression estimation technique is by far the most popular, 
with 30 contributions applying it. This is most likely due to the fact that this method is used for 
dichotomous dependent variables, with which, for instance, the variable of existence of a board 
committee can be captured. The traditional ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation is adopted in 19 
articles, whereby in some instances it is a pooled OLS method where the panel of data is analysed. In 
the case of seven articles, the event study methodology, with cumulative abnormal returns, was 
employed. Finally, there is a vast array of other quantitative methods used. However, their 
occurrences typically do not exceed five research papers. They include, amongst others, the Tobit 
model, probit or maximum likelihood estimation, structural equation modelling, factor analysis, 
cluster analysis, hierarchical regression model, simultaneous regression model, 2- and 3-stage least 
squares estimation (SLS), binomial regression, Poisson model, generalised method of moments 
(GMM) (Arellano and Bond, 1991) or instrumental variable (IV) regression (cf., Gujarati, 2008; 
Kennedy, 2008). In 14 papers, either no regression analysis was undertaken or the estimation 
technique was not reported, however, in many articles, more than one econometric technique was 
used. Identified in six research papers, the problem of endogeneity (reverse causality) is accounted 
for with the 2/3-SLS, IV or GMM model (Brown et al., 2011). In eight articles, the multiple moderated 
regression model (MMR) is adopted (Aiken and West, 1991). Accordingly, there remains increasing 
opportunities for introducing more advanced econometric estimation techniques than the OLS or 
logistic regression, as they do not feature in more than 10% of the 70 contributions based on the 
quantitative research methods. 
Half of the studies that are based on quantitative research methods have a longitudinal dimension 
(35), which is a strong result in terms of compiling datasets that go beyond the mere cross-section of 
observations. In 21 cases, the explicit use of a panel data analysis is reported, whereby in 14 
instances a firm’s fixed-effects estimation is adopted. This again shows notable advancement in 
board committee research, where panels of data are analysed, increasing the validity and rigour of 
this research. However, the analysis in the other 35 papers is still based on a cross-section of 
observations only, leaving ample scope for improvement in terms of providing board committee 
research with a time dimension. Finally, the sample size in the reviewed papers that were based on 
quantitative research methods, in cases where it could be established, ranged from 46 to 10,654 
firms. This demonstrates a large spread of datasets, whereby the majority of contributions employed 
a sample of 100 to 300 companies. 
Overall, this review of adopted methodologies in the analysed articles demonstrates strong 
domination of studies based on quantitative research methods in the US context. Among them, the 
traditional OLS and logistic regression are the most popular estimation techniques. A good share of 
the research papers have a longitudinal dimension whereby the analysis of panels of data is also 
reasonably employed. There is still scope for adoption of more advanced econometric techniques 
than the OLS and the logistic regression, especially given that the problem of endogeneity is 
accounted for in only about 10% of contributions based on quantitative research methods. However, 
the sheer spread of the adopted econometric techniques in the reviewed sample of articles, some 
being very advanced, such as 2-3 SLS or GMM, indicates clearly that indeed the strand of board 
committee research is, if not maturing, at least developing and gaining momentum, as is reflected in 
the number of contributions published in the most recent sub-period of 2004 to 2011. The scarcity 
of research with regards to qualitative evidence, as well as theoretical/review papers, is in line with 
the findings on the theoretical aspects of the reviewed articles. This means there is scope for 
uncovering the black box of board committee work, their composition, dynamics and functions, 
ideally leading to a solid theoretical foundation in this strand of corporate governance literature. 
 
5 Discussion and conclusions 
 
The picture that emerges from this literature review of academic work on board committees reflects 
the trends and patterns identified in corporate governance literature, in general: 
 
1. the prevalence of the agency theory 
 
2. the lack of other unifying theoretical framework 
 
3. strong US-centrism 
 
4. the dominance of quantitative research methods (Daily et al., 2003; Durisin and Puzone, 
2009; Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009; Huse et al., 2011; Pettigrew, 1992; Viganò et al., 2011). 
 
The majority of contributions come from the management and accounting perspectives. The 
intensity of research represents the following gradation, in descending order: audit, compensation 
and nomination committee. Finally, the greatest number of reviewed articles in the most recent sub-
period of 2004 to 2011 (60) reveals signs of the maturation, and possibly saturation, of this sub-
strand of corporate governance literature. 
These research findings demonstrate the increasing importance of this topical area in scholarly work 
on corporate governance. The remit of board committees is well defined in the regulatory 
documents, such as the UK Corporate Governance Code (2014). However, board committees are still 
nothing else than sub-sets of composition of the entire board, which makes their analysis 
significantly more complex than if this were not the case. Moreover, the nature of each committee’s 
work is quite different. Audit committees are to ensure the provision of accurate and high quality 
financial information. Compensation committees are responsible for the generation of well-designed 
incentive plans for managers. Finally, nomination committees are entrusted with the task of 
optimising the director nomination and selection process. Therefore, it is difficult to bring all these 
functions under the roof of one integrative theoretical framework. However, these complexities 
notwithstanding, there is a pressing need for a solid theoretical foundation in academic work on 
board committees. The community of scholars has to extend its scope beyond the confines of the 
agency theory and delve into the details of board committee work, composition, dynamics and 
functions. Uncovering the black box of this board institutional arrangement holds promise for the 
advancement of this sub- field of study, and ultimately, in overcoming the situation in which so 
many contributions appear as ‘atheoretical’. This somewhat echoes the calls in the corporate 
governance literature, in general, with regard to the entire corporate boards, to dismantle the 
fortresses of the agency theory domination (Daily et al., 2003; Huse et al., 2011; Pettigrew, 1992; 
Viganò et al., 2011). 
Strong US-centrism is another feature of academic work on board committees. The contributions on 
the UK, which is the second most represented country in the studied sample of articles, are smaller 
than those on the US by a factor of six. Accordingly, there is an urgent need to change the geography 
of academic work on board committees. Other countries’ contexts are very modestly represented, 
including the European countries from areas other than the Anglo-Saxon legal families, i.e., 
Germanic, Roman and Scandinavian (La Porta et al., 1998). Similarly, countries from continents other 
than North America and Europe, except for Australia, are poorly represented. There is, therefore, 
ample scope for scholars from under-represented countries to provide evidence on board 
committees in their jurisdictions, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and South 
America. Otherwise, the generalisability of findings in the extant literature would remain limited and 
confined mainly to the context of the Anglo-Saxon capitalism. For example, it would be interesting to 
see how the committee work would unfold in Germany, where there is a dual board structure with 
significant representation of trade unions, in line with the co-determination principle (Demb and 
Neubauer, 1992). It is clear there are many opportunities in terms of the geographical scope of 
board committee research that should ideally be addressed in the years to come. 
Research based on quantitative methods is by far the most popular (70 articles). Amongst research 
papers based on the quantitative methods, there is a good share of articles (35) that have a 
longitudinal dimension, which demonstrates that this sub-field of corporate governance research is 
reasonably advanced, as the trends and patterns are identified over time. There is, however, 
significant scope for alternative research methods that can be employed in academic work on board 
committees. Qualitative evidence would be advantageous in addressing the identified complexities 
of board committee structure as sub-sets of the entire corporate board, and the different remit and 
functions of audit, compensation, and nomination committees. It also has potential for 
advancements in theorising, and therefore contributing to a unifying theoretical framework in this 
sub- strand of corporate governance literature. Moreover, it is important as a research triangulation 
strategy, so that the findings generated through quantitative studies can be cross-checked and 
validated with qualitative evidence. 
Finally, there is ample scope for contributions from the finance and economics perspective, in 
particular. To date, the majority of contributions, over 90%, can be attributed to management and 
accounting scholars. It is conceivable that contributions from the disciplines of finance and 
economics can help shed new light on the theoretical efforts in board committee work and 
ultimately aid scholars in arriving at a unifying theoretical framework. Furthermore, they may 
increase the share of articles on the nomination and compensation committees, which lag behind 
the more mature audit committees (Carson, 2002). This is particularly promising as the number of 
contributions overall has been exponentially rising, with a handful of contributions before the mid-
1990s, and two-thirds of them published in the last sub-period of 2004 to 2011. 
Overall, this research aimed to unravel certain regularities and patterns in academic work on board 
committees. Since the mid-1990s, board committees have become an inextricable element of the 
corporate landscape and hence an object of research interest in corporate governance literature to 
date. There has not been a review of scholarly work on board committees as yet, except for Ghafran 
and O’Sullivan (2013), who have scrutinised papers on audit committees for a period of only ten 
years. We, in turn, looked at the three main board committees of audit, compensation and 
nomination over a period of almost a quarter of a century. The fact that our search for articles 
generated 90 contributions testifies to the fact that there has emerged a substantial sub-strand of 
corporate governance literature which warrants further attention. 
We identified several deficiencies in the literature on board committees, which if addressed, are 
likely to lead to a number of contributions in the future. They include the identification of an 
alternative to the agency theory theoretical perspective, increasing contributions from the finance 
and economics disciplines, carrying out more work on nomination and compensation committees, 
widening the geographic scope of board committee work, and generating more qualitative evidence 
in this stream of research. 
There is, therefore, significant potential for this sub-strand of corporate governance literature to 
develop further and ultimately mature and saturate. It is hoped that scholars will respond to these 
challenges and work to progress the literature in order that the emergent picture of the typical 
academic work on board committees based on the agency theory, quantitative research methods 
and US-based evidence is changed to encompass other theories, qualitative evidence and other 
countries’ contexts. 
Finally, this review aims to regroup and consolidate the body of knowledge on board committees. 
Their increasing importance, as reflected in this literature review, merits such a contribution with 
the view of taking stock of the extant literature and setting the research agenda for the future. 
Based on the work carried out in this article, we may conclude that the stream of research on board 
committees constitutes an important theme in the corporate governance literature which will 
develop even further in the years to come. 
 
Limitations and future research directions 
Future reviews of board committee literature can focus on a different selection of journals. They 
may also examine a different timespan than the one we have chosen and establish different patterns 
and trends, such as Ghafran and O’Sullivan (2013), for the decade of work on audit committees. 
Review work on particular committees, rather than all three of them together, would be 
advantageous in disentangling the intricacies of their functioning in more detail than is the case in 
this paper. Future research may also concentrate on the other types of board committees rather 
than the standard three of audit, compensation and nomination, especially since these new types of 
committees, such as governance, public affairs, or risk management committee, are more and more 
frequently encountered. Future review work on board committees may also adopt different review 
themes than theory and methodology to come up with other interesting findings and predictions. 
They could include, for instance, the analysis of theoretical and empirical contributions of articles on 
board committees. Finally, the analysis of this sub-strand of corporate governance literature could 
be undertaken against the backdrop of the entire corporate governance research in a bibliometric 
study, such as the one by Durisin and Puzone (2009). Overall, since this is one of the first reviews of 
this stream of research on board committees, there is ample scope for different designs and 
configurations in which to conduct this type of study in the future. If this potential is realised, many 
new predictions and findings could emerge to enrich the body of knowledge currently available on 
this research stream in scholarly work. 
  
References 
*Abbott, L.J., Parker, S., Peters, G.F. and Rama, D.V. (2007) ‘Corporate governance, audit quality, and 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: evidence from internal audit outsourcing’, Accounting Review, Vol. 82, No. 
4, pp.803–835. 
*Adut, D., Cready, W.H. and Lopez, T.J. (2003) ‘Restructuring charges and CEO cash compensation: a 
re-examination’, Accounting Review, Vol. 78, No. 1, pp.169–192. 
*Agoglia, C.P., Doupnik, T.S. and Tsakumis, G.T. (2011) ‘Principles-based versus rules-based 
accounting standards: the influence of standard precision and audit committee strength on financial 
reporting decisions’, Accounting Review, Vol. 86, No. 3, pp.747–767. 
Aiken, L.S. and West, S.G. (1991) Multiple Regression: Testing and Interpreting Interactions, Sage, 
London. 
Albert, M. (1993) Capitalism against Capitalism, Whurr, London. 
Alexander Jr., J.C. and Mabry, R.H. (1994) ‘Relative significance of journals, authors, and articles cited 
in financial research’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 49, No. 2, pp.697–712. 
Anderson, J.R. (2000) Cognitive Psychology and Its Implications, Worth Publishers, New York, NY. 
*Anderson, R.C., Mansi, S.A. and Reeb, D.M. (2004) ‘Board characteristics, accounting report 
integrity, and the cost of debt’, Journal of Accounting and  Economics, Vol. 37, No. 3, pp.315–342. 
Aoki, M. (2001) Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis, MIT Press, Cambridge. 
Arellano, M. and Bond, S. (1991) ‘Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence 
and an application to employment equations’, The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 58, No. 2, 
pp.277–297. 
*Arthaud-Day, M.L., Certo, S.T., Dalton, C.M. and Dalton, D.R. (2006) ‘A changing of the guard: 
Executive and director turnover following corporate financial restatements’, Academy of 
Management Journal, Vol. 49, No. 6, pp.1119–1136. 
Bart, C. (2010) ‘An analysis of Canadian audit committee charters’, International Journal of Business 
Governance and Ethics, Vol. 5, Nos. 1/2, pp.98–111. 
*Bebchuk, L.A., Grinstein, Y. and Peyer, U. (2010) ‘Lucky CEOs and lucky directors’, Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 65, No. 6, pp.2363–2401. 
Becker, G. (1964) Human Capital, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL. 
*Belliveau, M.A., O’Reilly III, C.A. and Wade, J.B. (1996) ‘Social capital at the top: effects of social 
similarity and status on CEO compensation’,  Academy  of  Management  Journal, Vol. 39, No. 6, 
pp.1568–1593. 
Berle, A.A. and Means, G.C. (1932) The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Macmillan, New 
York. 
*Bilimoria, D. and Piderit, S.K. (1994) ‘Board committee membership: effects of sex-based bias’, 
Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 37, No. 6, pp.1453–1477. 
Borokhovich, K.A., Bricker, R.J. and Simkins, B.J. (2000) ‘An analysis of finance journal impact factors’, 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 55, No. 3, pp.1457–1469. 
Brown, P., Beekes, W. and Verhoeven, P. (2011) ‘Corporate governance, accounting and finance: a 
review’, Accounting and Finance, Vol. 51, No. 1, pp.96–172. 
Burt, R.S. (1992) Structural Holes, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. 
Cadbury Report (1992) Committee on the Financial Aspects  of Corporate Governance, Gee, London. 
Callon, M. (1986) ‘Some elements of a sociology of translation: domestication of the scallops and the 
fishermen of St Brieuc Bay’, in Law, J. (Ed.): Power, Action and Belief: A New Sociology of 
Knowledge?, Routledge, London. 
*Carcello,  J.V.  and  Neal,  T.L.  (2000)  ‘Audit  committee  composition  and  auditor  reporting’, 
Accounting Review, Vol. 75, No. 4, pp.453–467. 
*Carcello, J.V. and Neal, T.L. (2003) ‘Audit committee characteristics and auditor dismissals following 
‘new’ going-concern reports’, Accounting Review, Vol. 78, No. 1, pp.95–117. 
*Carson, E. (2002) ‘Factors associated with the development of board sub-committees’, Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp.4–18. 
Castellan Jr., N.J. (1993) Individual and Group Decision Making, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, New 
York, NY. 
*Cheng, S. (2004) ‘R&D expenditures and CEO compensation’, Accounting Review, Vol. 79, No. 2, 
pp.305–328. 
Coleman, J.S. (1988) ‘Social capital in the creation of human capital’, American Journal of Sociology, 
Vol. 94, pp.95–120. 
*Collier, P. and Zaman, M. (2005) ‘Convergence in European corporate governance: the audit 
committee concept’, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 13, No. 6, pp.753–768. 
*Conyon, M.J. and Mallin, C. (1997) ‘Women in the boardroom: evidence from large UK companies’, 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp.112–117. 
*Conyon, M.J. and Peck, S.I. (1998) ‘Board control, remuneration committees and top management 
compensation’, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 41, No. 2, pp.146–157. 
Daily, C.M., Dalton, D. and Canella, A. (2003) ‘Corporate governance: decades of dialogue and data’, 
Academy of Management Review, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp.371–382. 
*Daily, C.M., Johnson, J.L., Ellstrand, A.E. and Dalton, D.R. (1998) ‘Compensation committee 
composition as a determinant of CEO compensation’, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 41, No. 
2, pp.209–220. 
Davis, J.H., Schoorman, F.D. and Donaldson, L. (1997) ‘Toward a stewardship theory of 
management’, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp.20–47. 
Demb, A. and Neubauer, F.F. (1992) ‘The corporate board: confronting the paradoxes’, Long Range 
Planning, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp.9–20. 
DiMaggio, P. and Powell, W. (1983) ‘The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective 
rationality in organizational fields’, American Sociological Review, Vol. 48, No. 2, pp.147–160. 
Durisin, B. and Puzone, F. (2009) ‘Maturation of corporate governance research, 1993–2007: an 
assessment’, Corporate Governance: an International Review, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp.266–291. 
Eisenhardt, K.M. (1989) ‘Agency theory: an assessment and review’, Academy of Management 
Review, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp.57–73. 
*Eminet, A. and Guedri, Z. (2010) ‘The role of nominating committees and director reputation in 
shaping the labor market for directors: an empirical assessment’, Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, Vol. 18, No. 6, pp.557–574. 
European Commission (2003) Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in 
the European Union- A Plan to Move Forward, Com (2003) 284, European Commission, Brussels. 
*Ezzamel, M. and Watson, R. (1998) ‘Market comparison earnings and the bidding-up of the 
executive cash compensation: evidence from the United Kingdom’, Academy of Management 
Journal, Vol. 41, No. 2, pp.221–231. 
Fama, E.F. and Jensen, M.C. (1983) ‘Separation of ownership and control’, Journal of Law and 
Economics, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp.301–325. 
Fama, E.G. (1980) ‘Agency problems and the theory of the firm’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 
88, No. 2, pp.280–307. 
Filatotchev, I. and Boyd, B.K. (2009) ‘Taking stock of corporate governance research  while looking to 
the future’, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp.257–265. 
Financial Reporting Council (1998) The Combined Code on Corporate Governance, FRC, London. 
Financial Reporting Council (2014) UK Corporate Governance Code, FRC, London. 
Freeman,  R.E.  and  Evan,  W.F.  (1990)  ‘Corporate  governance:  a  stakeholder  interpretation’, 
Journal of Behavioral Economics, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp.337–359. 
Ghafran, C. and O’Sullivan, N. (2013) ‘The governance role of audit committees: reviewing a decade 
of evidence’, International Journal of Management Reviews, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp.381–407. 
Gujarati, D. (2008) Basic Econometrics, 5th ed., McGraw-Hill/Irwin. 
Habbash, M. (2013) ‘Earnings management, audit committee effectiveness and the role of 
blockholders ownership: Evidence from large UK firms’, International Journal of Business Governance 
and Ethics, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp.155–180. 
Hamidi, D.Y. and Gabrielsson, J. (2014) ‘Developments and trends in research on board leadership: a 
systematic literature review’, International Journal of Business Governance and Ethics, Vol. 9, No. 3, 
pp.243–268. 
Hermalin, B.E. and Weisbach, M.S. (2003) ‘Boards of directors as an endogenously determined 
institution: a survey of the economic literature’, Economic Policy Review, April, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp.7–
26. 
Hillman, A.J. and Dalziel, T. (2003) ‘Boards of directors and firm performance: integrating agency and 
resource dependence perspectives’, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp.383–396. 
Hillman, A.J., Cannella, J.A.A. and Paetzold, R.L. (2000) ‘The resource dependence role of corporate 
directors: strategic adaption of board composition in response to environmental change’, Journal of 
Management Studies, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp.235–255. 
Huse, M. (2005) ‘Accountability and creating accountability: a framework for exploring behavioural 
perspectives of corporate governance’, British Journal of Management, Vol. 16, Supplement S1, 
pp.65–79. 
Huse, M. (2007) Boards, Governance and Value Creation: The Human Side of Corporate Governance, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Huse, M., Hoskisson, R., Zattoni, A. and Viganò, R. (2011) ‘New perspectives on board research: 
changing the research agenda’, Journal of Management and Governance, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp.5–28. 
Jensen, M.C. and Meckling, W. (1976) ‘Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and 
ownership structure’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp.305–360. 
Johnson, J., Daily, C. and Ellstrand, A. (1996) ‘Boards of directors: a review and research agenda’, 
Journal of Management, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp.409–438. 
Kennedy, P. (2008) A Guide to Econometrics, 6th ed., Wiley-Blackwell. 
*Kesner, I.F. (1988) ‘Directors’ characteristics and committee membership: an investigation of type, 
occupation, tenure and gender’, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp.66–84. 
*Kornish, L.J. and Levine, C.B. (2004) ‘Discipline with common agency: the case of audit and non-
audit services’, Accounting Review, Vol. 79, No. 1, pp.173–200. 
Kwee, Z., Van Den Bosch, F.A.J. and Volberda, H.W. (2011) ‘The influence of top management team’s 
corporate governance orientation on strategic renewal trajectories: a longitudinal analysis of Royal 
Dutch Shell plc, 1907-2004’, Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 48, No. 5, pp.984–1014. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. (1998) ‘Law and finance’, Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 106, No. 6, pp.1113–1154. 
*Laux, C. and Laux, V. (2009) ‘Board committees, CEO compensation, and earnings management’, 
Accounting Review, Vol. 84, No. 3, pp.869–891. 
Law, J. (1992) ‘Notes on the theory of the actor-network: Ordering, strategy and heterogeneity’, 
Systems Practice, Vol. 5, No. 4, pp.379–393. 
Lazear, E. and Rosen, S. (1981) ‘Rank order tournaments as optimum labor contracts’, Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 89, No. 5, pp.841–864. 
*McDaniel, L., Martin, R.D. and Maines, L.A. (2002) ‘Evaluating financial reporting quality: the effects 
of financial expertise vs. financial literacy (Supplement)’, Accounting Review, Vol. 77, No. s-1, 
pp.139–167. 
Meyer, J. and Rowan, B. (1977) ‘Institutional organizations: formal structure as myth and ceremony’, 
American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 83, No. 2, pp.340–363. 
Milliken, F.J. and Martins, L.L. (1996) ‘Searching for common threads: Understanding the multiple 
effects of diversity in organizational groups’, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 21, No. 2, 
pp.402–433. 
Minichilli, A., Zattoni, A. and Zona, F. (2009) ‘Making boards effective: an empirical examination of 
board task performance’, British Journal of Management, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.55–74. 
Mitchell, R.K., Agel, B.R. and Wood, D.J. (1997) ‘Toward a theory of stakeholder identification and 
salience’, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp.853–886. 
Muth, M. and Donaldson, L. (1998) ‘Stewardship theory and board structure: a contingency 
approach’, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp.5–28. 
*O’Reilly III, C.A., Main, B.G. and Crystal, G.S. (1988) ‘CEO compensation as tournament and social 
comparison: a tale of two theories’, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 2, pp.257–274. 
Pettigrew, A.M. (1992) ‘On studying managerial elites’, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 13, No. 
s-2, pp.163–182. 
Pfeffer, J. (1972) ‘Size and composition of corporate boards of directors’, Administrative Science 
Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp.218–228. 
Pfeffer, J. and Salancik, G. (1978) The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence 
Perspective, Harper and Row, New York. 
Podsakoff, P.M., MacKenzie, S.B., Bachrach, D.G. and Podsakoff, N.P. (2005) ‘The influence of 
management journals in the 1980s and 1990s’, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 26, No. 5, 
pp.473–488. 
Reinstein, A. and Calderon, T.G. (2006) ‘Examining accounting departments’ rankings of the quality 
of accounting journals’, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp.457–90. 
Ricketts, M. (2002) The Economics of Business Enterprise. An Introduction to Economic Organisation 
and the Theory of the Firm, 3rd ed., Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK. 
Rosen, S. (1986) ‘Prizes and incentives in elimination tournaments’, American Economic Review, Vol. 
76, No. 4, pp.701–715. 
*Ruigrok, W., Peck, S., Tacheva, S., Greve, P. and Hu, Y. (2006) ‘The determinants and effects of 
board nomination committees’, Journal of Management and Governance, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp.119–
148. 
Ryan, H.E. and Wiggins, R.A. (2004) ‘Who is in whose pocket? Director compensation, board 
independence, and barriers to effective monitoring’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 73, No. 3, 
pp.497–524. 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) (2002) Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act/ 
Corporate and Auditing Accountability and Responsibility Act., Pub. L. 107-204, 116, Stat.745, 
enacted July 30th, 2002. 
Schwartz, B.N., Williams, S. and Williams, P.F. (2005) ‘US doctoral students’ familiarity with the 
accounting journals: Insights onto the structure of the US academy’, Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting, Vol. 16, No. 3, pp.327–348. 
Scott, W.R. (1995) Institutions and Organizations, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA. 
Security Exchange Commission (SEC) (1999) Audit Committee Disclosure, 22 December, Release No. 
34–42266, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC. 
*Shivdasani, A. and Yermack, D. (1999) ‘CEO involvement in the selection of new board members: an 
empirical analysis’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 54, No. 5, pp.1829–1853. 
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1997) ‘A survey of corporate governance’, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 52, 
No. 2, pp.737–783. 
*Spira, L.F. (1998) ‘An evolutionary perspective on audit committee effectiveness’, Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp.29–38. 
*Spira, L.F. (2000) ‘Ceremonies of governance: perspectives on the role of the audit committee’, 
Journal of Management and Governance, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp.231–260. 
*Spira, L.F. (2003) ‘Audit committees: begging the question’, Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp.180–188. 
Steger, T. (2014) ‘What have we not researched? And why not? – Some reflections on the ‘blind 
spots’ of corporate governance and board research’, International Journal of Business Governance 
and Ethics, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp.121–135. 
Suchman, M.C. (1995) ‘Managing legitimacy: strategic and institutional approaches’, Academy of 
Management Review, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp.571–610. 
Tahai, A. and Meyer, M.J. (1999) ‘A revealed preference study of management journals’ direct 
influences’, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp.279–296. 
*Tengamnuay, K. and Stapleton, P. (2009) ‘The role of the audit committee in Thailand: a mature 
monitoring mechanism or an evolving process?’, Journal of Management and Governance, Vol. 13, 
No. 3, pp.131–161. 
*Turley, S. and Zaman, M. (2004) ‘The corporate governance effects of audit committees’, Journal of 
Management and Governance, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp.305–332. 
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1974) ‘Judgment and uncertainty: heuristics and biases’, Science, Vol. 
185, No. 4157, pp.1124–1131. 
Viganò, R., Zattoni, A., Hoskisson, R.E. and Huse, M. (2011) ‘New perspectives on board research’, 
Journal of Management and Governance, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp.1–4. 
Walther, A. and Morner, M. (2014) ‘Opening the black box of nomination committees: a case study 
of non-executive director selections in German supervisory boards’, International Journal of Business 
Governance and Ethics, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp.136–154. 
Westphal, J.D. and Milton, L.P. (2000) ‘How experience and network ties affect the influence of 
demographic minorities on corporate boards’, Administrative Science  Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 2, 
pp.366–398. 
Westphal, J.D. and Zajac, E.J. (2013) ‘A behavioral theory of corporate governance: Explicating the 
mechanisms of socially situated and socially constituted agency’, Academy of Management Annals, 
Vol. 7, No. 1, pp.607–661. 
Williams, K.Y. and O’Reilly, C.A. (1998) ‘Demography and diversity in organizations: a review of 40 
years of research’, in Staw, B.M. and Cummings, L.L. (Eds.): Research in Organizational Behaviour, 
pp.77–140, JAI Press, Greenwich. 
Yates, J.F. (1990) Judgment and Decision Making, Prentice Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ. 
Zahra, S.A. and Pearce, J.A. (1989) ‘Boards of directors and corporate financial performance: a 
review and integrative model’, Journal of Management, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp.291–334. 
*Zhang, Y. (2008) ‘Information asymmetry and the dismissal of newly appointed CEOs: an empirical 
investigation’, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 29, No. 8, pp.859–872. 
 
 
Bibliography 
*Adams, R.B. and Fereira, D. (2009) ‘Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and 
performance’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 94, No. 2, pp.291–309. 
*Al-Twaijry, A.A., Brierley, J.A. and Gwilliam, D.R. (2002) ‘An examination of the role of audit 
committees in the Saudi Arabian corporate sector’, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 
Vol. 10, No. 4, pp.288–297. 
*Beasley, M.S. (1996) ‘An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director 
composition and financial statement fraud’, Accounting Review, Vol. 71, No. 4, pp.443–465. 
*Bédard, J., Coulombe, D. and Courteau. L. (2008) ‘Audit committee, underpricing of IPOs, and 
accuracy of management earnings forecasts’, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 
16, No. 6, pp.519–535. 
*Berrone, P. and Gomez-Mejia, L.R. (2009) ‘Environmental performance and executive 
compensation: An integrated agency-institutional perspective’, Academy of Management Journal, 
Vol. 52, No. 1, pp.103–126. 
*Brown, I., Steen, A. and Foreman, J. (2009) ‘Risk management in corporate governance: a review 
and proposal’, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 17, No. 5, pp.546–558. 
*Carter, D.A., D’Souza, F., Simkins, B.J. and Simpson, W.G. (2010) ‘The gender and ethnic diversity of 
US boards and board committees and firm financial performance’, Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, Vol. 18, No. 5, pp.396–414. 
*Caskey,  J.,  Nagar,  V.  and  Petacchi,  P.  (2010)  ‘Reporting  bias  with  an  audit  committee’, 
Accounting Review, Vol. 85, No. 2, pp.447–481. 
*Chambers, A.D. (2005) ‘Audit committees: practice, rules and enforcement in the UK and China’, 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp.92–100. 
*Chan, K.C. and Li, J. (2008) ‘Audit committee and firm value: evidence on outside top executives as 
expert-independent directors’, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 16, No. 1, 
pp.16–31. 
*Chang, J.C. and Sun, H.L. (2009) ‘Cross-listed foreign firms’ earnings informativeness, earnings 
management and disclosures of corporate governance information under SOX’, International Journal 
of Accounting, Vol. 44, No. 1, pp.1–32. 
*Chen, J., Duh, R.R. and Shiue, F.N. (2008) ‘The effect of audit committees on earnings-return 
association: Evidence from foreign registrants in the United States’, Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp.32–40. 
*Chen, J.J., Liu, X. and Li, W. (2010) ‘The effects of insider control and global benchmarks on Chinese 
executive compensation’, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp.107–
123. 
*Comprix, J. and Muller III, K.A. (2006) ‘Asymmetric treatment of reported pension expense and 
income amounts in CEO cash compensation calculations’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 
42, No. 3, pp.385–416. 
*Daily, C.M. (1996) ‘Governance patterns in bankruptcy reorganizations’, Strategic Management 
Journal, Vol. 17, No. 5, pp.355–375. 
*Dechow, P.M., Huson, M.R. and Sloan, R.G. (1994) ‘The effect of restructuring charges on 
executives’ cash compensation’, Accounting Review, Vol. 69, No. 1, pp.138–156. 
*DeFond, M.L., Hann, R.N. and Hu, X. (2005) ‘Does the market value financial expertise on audit 
committees of boards of directors?’, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 43, No. 2, pp.153–193. 
*Dey, A. (2008) ‘Corporate governance and agency conflicts’, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 
46, No. 5, pp.1143–1181. 
*Engel, E. (2005) ‘Discussion of Does the market value financial expertise on audit committees of 
boards of directors’, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 43, No. 2, pp.195–204. 
*Engel, E., Hayes, R.M. and Wang, X. (2010) ‘Audit committee compensation and the demand for 
monitoring of the financial reporting process’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 49, Nos. 1–
2, pp.136–154. 
*Faleye, O., Hoitash, R. and Hoitash, U. (2011) ‘The costs of intense board monitoring’, Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 101, No. 1, pp.160–181. 
*Farber, D.B. (2005) ‘Restoring trust after fraud: does corporate governance matter?’, Accounting 
Review, Vol. 80, No. 2, pp.539–561. 
*Ferris,  S.P.,  Jagannathan,  M.  and  Pritchard,  A.C.  (2003)  ‘Too  busy  to  mind  the  business? 
Monitoring by directors with multiple board appointments’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 58, No. 3, 
pp.1087–1111. 
*Gaynor, L.M., McDaniel, L.S. and Neal, T.L. (2006) ‘The effects of joint provision and disclosure of 
non-audit services on audit committee members’ decisions and investors’ preferences’, Accounting 
Review, Vol. 81, No. 4, pp.873–896. 
*Gore, A.K., Matsunaga, S. and Yeung, P.E. (2011) ‘Research notes and commentaries: the role of 
technical expertise in firm governance structure: evidence from chief financial officer contractual 
incentives’, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp.771–786. 
*Hoitash, U., Hoitash, R. and Bedard, J.C. (2009) ‘Corporate governance and internal control over 
financial reporting: a comparison of regulatory regimes’, Accounting Review, Vol. 84, No. 3, pp.839–
867. 
*Huang, H., Lobo, G.J. and Zhou, J. (2009) ‘Determinants and accounting consequences of forming a 
governance committee: evidence from the United States’, Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, Vol. 17, No. 6, pp.710–727. 
*Karamanou, I. and Vafeas, N. (2005) ‘The association between corporate boards, audit committees, 
and management earnings forecasts: an empirical analysis’, Journal  of Accounting Research, Vol. 43, 
No. 3, pp.453–486. 
*Klein, A. (2002a) ‘Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management’, 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 33, No. 3, pp.375–400. 
*Klein, A. (2002b) ‘Economic determinants of audit committee independence’, Accounting Review, 
Vol. 77, No. 2, pp.435–452. 
*Krishnan,  J.  (2005)  ‘Audit  committee  quality  and  internal  control:  an  empirical  analysis’, 
Accounting Review, Vol. 80, No. 2, pp.649–675. 
*Linck, J.S., Netter, J.M. and Yang, T. (2009) ‘The effects and unintended consequences of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the supply and demand for directors’, Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 22, No. 
8, pp.3286–3328. 
*Luoma, P. and Goodstein, J. (1999) ‘Research notes: stakeholders and corporate boards: 
institutional influences on board composition and structure’, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 
42, No. 5, pp.553–563. 
*Magilke, M.J., Mayhew, B.W. and Pike, J.E. (2009) ‘Are independent audit committee members 
objective? Experimental evidence’, Accounting Review, Vol. 84, No. 6, pp.1959–1981. 
*Main, B.G., Jackson, C., Pymm J. and Wright, V. (2008) ‘The remuneration committee and strategic 
human resource management’, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 16, No. 3, 
pp.225–238. 
*Mangena, M. and Chamisa, E. (2008) ‘Corporate governance and incidences of listing suspension by 
the JSE Securities Exchange of South Africa: an empirical analysis’, International Journal of 
Accounting, Vol. 43, No. 1, pp.28–44. 
*Marra, A., Mazzola, P. and Prencipe, A. (2011) ‘Board monitoring and earnings management pre- 
and post-IFRS’, International Journal of Accounting, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp.205–230. 
*Méndez, C.F. and García, R.A. (2007) ‘The effects of ownership structure and board composition on 
the audit committee meeting frequency: Spanish evidence’, Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, Vol. 15, No. 5, pp.909–922. 
*Naiker, V. and Sharma, D.S. (2009) ‘Former audit partners on the audit committee and internal 
control deficiencies’, Accounting Review, Vol. 84, No. 2, pp.559–587. 
*Ng, T.B.-P. and Tan, H-T. (2003) ‘Effects of authoritative guidance availability and audit committee 
effectiveness on auditors’ judgments in an auditor-client negotiation context’, Accounting Review, 
Vol. 78, No. 3, pp.801–818. 
*O’Sullivan, M., Percy, M. and Stewart, J. (2008) ‘Australian evidence on corporate governance 
attributes and their association with forward-looking information in the annual report’, Journal of 
Management and Governance, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp.5–35. 
*Osma, B.G. and Noguer, B.G.D.A. (2007) ‘The effect of the board composition and its monitoring 
committees on earnings management: evidence from Spain’, Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, Vol. 15, No. 6, pp.1413–1428. 
*Peterson, C.A., Philpot, J. and O’Shaughnessy, K.C. (2007) ‘African-American diversity in the 
boardrooms of the US Fortune 500: Director presence, expertise and committee membership’, 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp.558–575. 
*Poulsen, T., Strand, T. and Thomsen, S. (2010) ‘Voting power and shareholder activism: a study of 
Swedish shareholder meetings’, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 18, No. 4, 
pp.329–343. 
*Premuroso, R.F. and Bhattacharya, S. (2007) ‘Is there a relationship between firm performance, 
corporate governance, and a firm’s decision to form a technology committee’, Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, Vol. 15, No. 6, pp.1260–1276. 
*Pucheta-Martinez, M.C. and de Fuentes, C. (2007) ‘The impact of audit committee characteristics 
on the enhancement of the quality of financial reporting: an empirical study in the Spanish context’, 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 15, No. 6, pp.1394–1412. 
*Ravina, E. and Sapienza, P. (2010) ‘What do independent directors know? Evidence from their 
trading’, Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp.962–1003. 
*Richardson, S.A. (2005) ‘Discussion of consequences of financial reporting failure for outside 
directors: evidence from accounting restatements and audit committee members’, Journal of 
Accounting Research, Vol. 43, No. 2, pp.335–342. 
*Ruiz-Barbadillo, E., Biedma- López, E. and Gómez- Aguilar, N. (2007) ‘Managerial dominance and 
audit committee independence in Spanish corporate governance’, Journal of Management and 
Governance, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp.311–352. 
*Setia-Atmaja, L.Y. (2009) ‘Governance mechanisms and firm value: the impact of ownership 
concentration and dividends’, Corporate Governance: An International  Review,  Vol.  17, No. 6, 
pp.694–709. 
*Seward, J.K. and Walsh, J.P. (1996) ‘The governance and control of voluntary corporate spin- offs’, 
Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp.25–39. 
*Spira, L.F. and Bender, R. (2004) ‘Compare and contrast: perspectives on board committees’, 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp.489–499. 
*Srinivasan, S. (2005) ‘Consequences of financial reporting failure for outside directors: evidence 
from accounting restatements and audit committee members’, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 
43, No. 2, pp.291–334. 
*Sun, J. and Cahan, S. (2009) ‘The effect of compensation committee quality on the association 
between CEO cash compensation and accounting performance’, Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp.193–207. 
*Vafeas, N. (2000) ‘The determinants of compensation committee membership’, Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp.356–366. 
*Weir, C. and Laing, D. (2000) ‘The performance-governance relationship: the effects of Cadbury 
compliance on UK quoted companies’, Journal of Management and Governance, Vol. 4, No. 4, 
pp.265–281. 
*Wysocki, P. (2010) ‘Corporate compensation policies and audit fees’, Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, Vol. 49, Nos. 1–2, pp.155–160. 
*Yeh, Y.H., Chung, H. and Liu, C.L. (2011) ‘Committee independence and financial institution 
performance during the 2007-08 credit crunch: evidence from a multi-country study’, Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, Vol. 19, No. 5, pp.437–458. 
*Zain, M.M. and Subramaniam, N. (2007) ‘Internal auditor perceptions on audit committee 
interactions: a qualitative study in Malaysian public corporations’, Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, Vol. 15, No. 5, pp.894–908. 
 
Asterisk (*) denotes articles included in the review (90). 
